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July 23, 2002
Miriam
Grace A. Go, a senior political writer of Philippines’ Newsbreak
Magazine spent six weeks in Thailand since May 13, 2002 on 2002
SEAPA Fellowship Program. She last month discovered several factors
that made Thailand’s first trial of the party-list ballot, modeled
after Philippines succeeded in the 1999 general election.
Both systems shared the same
objectives-to encourage people to vote for parties based on their
program of government and track record and to open doors to more
qualified individuals, enlisted by the parties, who do not have
the money and the personal connections to make him win in locality-based
elections.
Nevertheless, Philippines’
party-list system elections in 1998 and 2001 failed. In 1998 ballot,
a fourth of the 52 party-list seats in the House of Representatives
was filled in. In 2001, the results were more tragic: only seven
of the 52 seats have been filled so far. 8 of the 11 winning groups
were belatedly disqualified by the Supreme Court.
“I hoped my story could help
lesson communities in Philippines as they are struggling to find
ways to improve the system before next election due in 2004. Some
time Filipino officials are arrogant, trying to avoid learning lessons
from the neighbors. But my point is if it (party-list system) could
work well in Thailand, why not in Philippine”, she said.
Here is her story “ Fixing
R.P.’s Party List Mess: Doing it the Thai way? The same story was
published in her magazine dated July 22, 2002
FIXING
R.P.’s PARTY LIST MESS
Doing
It the Thai Way
By Miriam Grace A. Go
BANGKOK—In a country like
the Philippines, where the P50-billion-a-year illegal drug trade
had been destroying the lives of some 1.7 million persons and, consequently,
their families and communities, what impression would it create
if an anti-drug foundation wins big in the party-list election?
It means the public, especially the youth sector that delivered
the vote, somehow understood that the ballot could get them started
in addressing a national program.
Yet more than a year after
MAD or Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (The People Hate Drugs) garnered
the second highest number of votes in the party-list poll of 2001,
it is still awaiting proclamation by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), the hopes of its 1.52 million believers—10 percent of
the total votes cast in the exercise—frustrated. MAD and most of
the winning groups were retroactively disqualified due to an unnecessary
legal debate on what the party list was all about.
If MAD ran that same year
in the first party-list election of Thailand—where illegal drugs
is also a big national concern—it would not have been visited by
such a nightmare. In Thailand, in fact, the party that landed on
the number two spot captured six million votes that translated to
31 seats in the parliament.
Why Thailand? Because its
four-year-old party-list concept shares basic features with the
Philippines’ 15-year-old system. (See table.) Its newly established
poll body that carried out the first party-list elections was largely
modeled after the Philippines’ 1940-formed Comelec. In both countries,
this new manner of electing some members of the House of Representatives
was introduced after a long tradition of personality-based and mudslinging
campaigns and fraud-marred elections. Thailand succeeded on first
try; the Philippines has failed in two elections so far.
In 1998, the Philippine failure
only meant being able to fill only a fourth of the 52 party-list
seats in the House of Representatives. In 2001, the results were
more tragic: only seven of the 52 seats have been filled so far.
Eight of the 11 winning groups were belatedly disqualified by the
Supreme Court in a case that tells a lot of where the Philippine
model went wrong.
Two of the disqualified groups,
tapping political connections, managed to wangle exceptions from
court decision. The rest, including MAD, have been left to appeal
their cases without help from the Comelec that allowed them to run
and validated their votes to begin with. And at the rate the questions
raised by this cases about the real intent of the party-list system
is being addressed by the government, the next party-list election,
which is just two years away, is likely to fail, too.
“It’s another sad case of
the Philippines having a headstart and Thailand overtaking us,”
says lawyer Chito Gascon, one of the framers of the Philippine Constitution
that introduced the party-list system. Now executive director of
the National Institute of Policy Studies, he was the first to point
out the many similarities of the two countries’ party-list systems.
“It was a matter of Thai voters being more mature than Filipinos
in the sense that they understood what the party list was—that it
is a system of proportional representation.”
Platforms
vs personalities
Both the Philippines and
Thailand have a mixed House of Representative, composed of those
elected through party list and those elected in localities. In the
Philippines, the latter are called congressmen, from geo-political
districts of four to five towns each. In Thailand, they are called
MPs (members of parliament), from every population of at least 150,000
each. A voter therefore has to cast two votes: one for a representative
of his locality, one for a party that is seeking nationwide mandate.
Thailand has limited party-list
participants to political parties, while the Philippines has opened
the contest to just about any kind of organization—political parties,
cause-oriented and advocacy groups, foundations, cooperatives—except
those that are religious in nature, getting foreign funding for
their campaigns, and espousing violence.
What helped Thailand succeed
was an extensive and innovative information campaign initiated by
the government. The Philippines missed out on this very basic element,
thus allowing partisan groups to frustrate the system laid out by
law.
The party-list system was
introduced in both countries to provide a balance for locality-based
lawmakers, who are almost always elected based on their personalities
and the doleouts they can afford. The party-list system is to encourage
people to vote for parties based on their program of government
and track record. It is also meant to open doors to more qualified
individuals, enlisted by the parties, who do not have the money
and the personal connections to make him win in locality-based elections,
but whose platform may appeal to voters nationwide.
Along with this clear idea
of the intent of the party list, the Election Commission of Thailand
also made sure the people understood the first step in the party-list
poll: vote for a party, not its nominees. To further ensure this,
the names and logos of the parties were pre-printed on the ballots,
so the voters would just cross out the boxes corresponding to their
parties of choice.
“The most effective strategy
was face-to-face communication,” says Dr. Gothom Arya, a former
election commissioner of Thailand whose job was to design a program
that would familiarize voters with the new electoral processes put
in place by the 1997 Constitution. The party-list system was just
one of them.
Worth the
money
With a 1-billion-baht (P1.66
billion) appropriation, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT)
recruited 20,000 new college graduates in April 1999, one and a
half years before the first party-list election. The volunteers
went around in the 76 provinces and in Bangkok to explain to families
the new election procedures.
The commission also sent
to registered households posters and sample ballots explaining the
new manner of casting votes. The layout and design of the samples
were the same as the ones put up at polling precincts on election
day, so as not to confuse the voters. Some 5 million baht (P8.3
million) were spent on this.
The ECT also enlisted the
help of NGOs in the provinces. The People’s Network for Elections
in Thailand (P-Net) produced cassette tapes containing election
songs. P-Net secretary Somchai Srisutthiyakorn says that to create
impact, they set the lyrics on the traditional music of individual
regions—for instance, the moa rum in the northeast provinces,
and the manorah in south. Every morning, these songs roared
from their village towers, the equivalent of barangay halls in the
Philippines. Copies of the tapes had been distributed in schools,
too, to prepare students who will vote in the future.
Usually in cooperation with
the private sector, demonstrations on the new polling procedures
were organized for the public to try out, and for the media to cover.
Although he acknowledges
the power of the media, Gothom says he avoided the traditional promotion
by way of placing paid newspaper or broadcast advertisement because
these were not just expensive, but were also easily forgotten by
the public. Anyway, radio and TV, the media with the widest audience
reach, were mostly government owned and were only too willing to
air information on the party-list system for free.
In contrast, the Philippines’
Comelec, with a budget of P110 million, relied merely on paid advertisements,
placed only several weeks before the first party-list election in
1998. The pamphlets it produced explaining proportional representation
were not widely disseminated despite the fact that it had a department
exclusively tasked to do that.
This is ironic because years
earlier, surveys were already done by the Social Weather Stations
(SWS), the leading poll firm in the Philippines, showing that there
had been “public demand for more information” on the elections through
more personal means.
In a speech in February 1998,
while enumerating possible ways to educate the voters, SWS director
Mahar Mangahas seemed to be reading what Dr. Gothom was thinking
in Thailand: “The most popular mass medium for communications… is
television… [but] they are too easy for the public to forget. It
is much easier to remember messages transmitted in the form of stories.
Most effective of all, is experimental learning, which in this case
would be learning from participation in electoral exercises, either
actual or simulated.”
Valid ballots
say it
The high voter turnout (69.9
percent of the 42 million qualified voters) in 2001 is not the gauge
for the electorate’s level of awareness of the party list; in Thailand,
voting is semi-compulsory. What is significant was that all those
29.91 million voters who went out to vote for constituency-based
MPs also cast votes for the party list.
More significantly, says
ECT deputy secretary Piroon Chatwanichkul, only 2.5 percent of the
party-list ballots were invalidated, indicating that most voters
understood how the new system of voting worked.
Also, an ECT volunteer interviewed
by the Bangkok Post during the campaign recalled that people
initially thought that voting for a party was impersonal compared
to choosing their local MPs. Voters thought, too, that there was
no way of telling which political party would be better, that they
were all the same.
But came election day, Thai
Rak Thai (TRT), a newly formed party, got an overwhelming 38.87
percent of the party-list votes because of its pro-poor platform.
Although there is a debate now on whether the populist promises
made during the campaign were sincere, political observers of various
stripes acknowledge that TRT’s experience showed that Thai voters
were capable of judging parties based on platforms, on “qualifications.”
In the 2001 campaign in the
Philippines, MAD ran on a relevant cause, catchy acronym and logo,
determined information campaign, and, not to mention, the popularity
of its top nominee Richard Gomez as an actor and sportsman. Such
strategies could have worked among Thais as well, if we are to go
by how most of them subscribed to the TRT platform. Interestingly,
Thais also regard illegal drugs as a big national problem. In fact,
being a drug addict is the first ground for the disqualification
of a lawmaker which the Thai Constitution lays down.
Piroon says that the party-list
exercise in Thailand still had traces of the traditional personality-based
campaign—enlisting celebrities who had qualifications to boost the
party’s popularity, and telling people how many lawyers or doctors
were on its list. He accepts them, however, as “campaign strategies”
that parties had the right to employ. The important thing, he says,
is that the procedure was understood by the public and carried out
smoothly by government.
Gothom says the purpose of
an information campaign is to help voters make an informed choice
when election comes, regardless of whether their choice, such as
TRT or MAD, would be acceptable to the so-called progressive NGOs
or the discriminating media.
NGOs take
over
Failing an honest-to-goodness
information campaign by the Comelec, partisan NGOs in the Philippines
took it upon themselves to explain to communities what the party
list was. But since many of these NGOs were also running in the
party-list election, and were threatened by stronger rivals, some
of them gave voters a twisted interpretation of the system.
These NGOs said that the
party-list seats are reserved for groups like them that “genuinely”
represented the “marginalized” sectors. The other organizations
accredited by the Comelec were “bogus,” they said.
In this convoluted line of
argument, the “genuine” NGOs’ weapon was a sentence in the Constitution
and the party-list law that, for the purpose of clarity, enumerates
which sectors are referred to as “marginalized.” What those documents
actually say is that there are many types of organizations that
can compete in the party-list election, and that NGOs, such as those
representing the basic sectors, can join, too.
To that misinterpreted provision,
professor Wilfrido Villacorta, one of the framers of the Philippine
Constitution, says, “I plead guilty.” He has realized that having
those sectors enumerated apparently gave the NGOs the impression
that they had to be accorded “special treatment,” an attitude that
could cause to them to “remain mendicants.”
During the campaigns of 1998
and 2001 then, what was “marginalized” and “genuine” was determined
by the NGOs that called press conferences and issued press releases
most often, and beat the rest in accusing other groups as “bogus.”
They were the groups with communist leanings.
Unfortunately, a media that
obviously did not read up on its law never pointed out that the
NGOs’ claims were contrary to what the Constitution and the party-list
law say, further confusing the voters. Not a single report in the
past two party-list campaigns pointed out that the party list, to
begin with, was not about “marginalized” and “big” NGOs, but about
proportional representation.
Despite the Left’s propaganda
offensive, some of their pet peeves made it to the winning circle.
MAD, which they said was not marginalized because it rode on the
government’s anti-drugs campaign (something which is not prohibited
under the party-list law), finished second. The Veterans Federation
Party, a 1998 party-list winner that got to serve in the past Congress
but which they said now was not marginalized because it was backed
by defense department, finished fourth. The political parties, which
they said were not marginalized because their members already won
in the district elections, finished fifth (Promdi or “Province First”
Development Initiatives), sixth (Nationalist People’s Coalition),
ninth (Lakas-NUCD), and eleventh (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
or Struggle of Democratic Filipinos).
The leftist groups in the
party-list contest brought their case to the Supreme Court in 2001,
asking that these groups they classified as non-marginalized be
disqualified. The Supreme Court, in a display of what Gascon called
“misguided judicial activism,” adopted the argument of the complainants.
A national daily branded the ruling as “one of the most idiotic
judicial decisions in the history of mankind.”
‘They will
only create problems’
“Our system is less complicated
because we do not allow NGOs to join the party list,” says Dr. Suchit
Bunbongkarn, a member of the assembly that drafted the 1997 Thai
Constitution. Although he also considers the NGOs’ electoral participation
as a political breakthrough, they should be made to play fair, he
says.
Suchit is now a justice of
the Constitutional Court, an independent body whose task is to decide
if any bill, law, government rule or policy is in accordance with
the Charter. If there was such a court in the Philippines, it would
have been the one to decide on the controversial party-list case
of 2001. And Suchit says, “If they (NGOs) want that privilege [of
participating in the party list], they have to transform themselves
into political parties, and compete as the others do.”
He says that if NGOs want
to push their cause, their leaders may run in other arena, such
as the senatorial or the constituency-based polls. In their senatorial
elections, where candidates are required to run as independents,
30 percent of the seats were captured by former NGO leaders.
Gothom, formerly the leader
of an NGO called Poll Watch Foundation, says there is nothing wrong
with NGO leaders entering politics. But “dragging the entire movement
or NGO into the elections” is a different story. In a party-list
contest, he points out, participants cannot claim moral distinction
from the others—all of them are “after state power.” Which group
gets represented should therefore be determined by nothing else
but the number of votes it gathered, he says.
Besides, Suchit points out
that, as the Thai system has shown, there is no guarantee that the
party’s campaign platform will be realized when its nominees are
already in the parliament. “Representing the people’s voice will
always depend on individual politicians,” he says.
Political scientist Sida
Sonskri of Thammasat University came to the Philippines in 1996
to study the structure of the Comelec and the country’s electoral
processes, with the intention of recommending to Thailand’s Constitutional
Drafting Assembly whatever good points she could pick up. The inclusion
of NGOs in the party list appealed to her, but she claims that her
government readily shot down the idea. “They didn’t trust NGOs and
were so sure that they would only create problems,” she recalls.
Sida says that Thai NGOs
may need 10 more years to develop that the political strength of
their counterparts in the Philippines, such that they could network,
form their political party, and compete in the party-list poll.
Except for the fact that the NGOs in the Philippines had overdone
their campaign, she says, the Philippines’ party-list system would
be “useful because no one else will propose laws for the sectors
except their own groups.”
Start from
square one
Gothom and Sida say it is
unfortunate that the Philippines would fail in aspects where it
has always been assumed to be stronger than Thailand. First, the
Comelec is in a position to smoothly run a continuing voters’ education
program because its provincial officers are civil servants who do
not get replaced so often, unlike in Thailand where they are appointed
and may be replaced whimsically.
They say that the election
watchdogs in the Philippines—such as the National Movement for Free
Elections, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting, Vote
Care, and others—have established and more extensive networks than
those in Thailand. They have also proven their ability to enlist
volunteers on meager budgets, and have them work until the canvassing
is through. If the Comelec could enlist their help, the government
will accomplish the information drive without having to spend as
much as Thailand did.
The Philippine party-list
system clearly has to start from square one. Gothom suggests: “Before
you do an information campaign, you will have to decide first whether
to amend your Constitution’s provision on the party list, or accept
the Supreme Court decision. Otherwise, people will be saying different
things and the public will remain confused.”
Philippine Congress is talking
about amending the Constitution, and it will be wise for it to fix
up the party-list mess in the process before another obvious failure
takes place in the 2004 elections. Otherwise, it may be better to
save the government’s money, and spare the people’s time and aspirations,
by scrapping this pretension about proportional representation altogether.
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