Military Dynamics in Aceh Conflict

By: Yee Siong Tong

Will the ongoing military operation against separatist rebels in the Aceh province work?

The answer depends pretty much on to whom this question is asked in Indonesia, and how a military success is defined.

Since President Megawati Soekarnoputri declared martial law on May 19 and gave the green light to a six-month integrated operation, voices which speak against the operation have not ceased as the military operation enters its fourth month.

It may be an unspoken fact but much criticism and scepticism are not targeted at questioning the necessity of the overall operation. Instead, critics and sceptics are more concerned with three issues related to the military operation – the discipline of personnel involved, the objective and the duration.

This concern reflects a lack of confidence in the military credibility and accountability, which is understandable.

After all, the Indonesian military (TNI) which is currently battling the guerillas who have fought for an independent state of Aceh for the last 27 years, was not without its fair share of mistakes during its previous operations in the province, most notably the decade-long Kolakops Jaring Merah which ended in 1998.

The combat command, now infamously referred to as Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM), was intended to crush the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) but did exactly the opposite – it resulted in some 3,000 deaths and consequentially strengthened GAM by giving it the much-needed fodder in its recruitment campaign.

Aside from this, historical baggage also plays a key role in fuelling speculation among military observers, activists, journalists and the likes that the military is not truly committed to its job in Aceh this time around.

For 30 years, the TNI was given extensive consultative and decision-making power in the social and political affairs.

Until the fall of Suharto five years ago, many military leaders were known to have used force to help perpetuate the former president’s grip to power, and got away with it. Since then, civil society groups and democracy-minded strategists have called for reforms within TNI.

To them, TNI should be involved only in external defence and should stay away from matters of internal security, as well as political and social stability.

Seen in this light, it is unsurprising that some are worried that TNI may use the latest military operation in Aceh to reassert, or retain, the political influence that it had long enjoyed.

Ikrar Nusa Bakti, a political researcher and military observer at Indonesian Institute of Sciences, is among such people who share the worry.

He said the military seems interested to stay on in politics, even though it will keep its promise to relinquish its long-held seats in the the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 2004 and in the House of Representatives (DPR) in 2009.

“They want to remain influential and have their opinions taken into consideration even when they do not hold formal posts anymore.

“A military success in Aceh will help them to achieve just that. They will say, ‘Look, we were right in beginning war in Aceh’,” he said.

Otto Samsuddin Ishak, a sociologist who had authored several books on the separatist struggle in Aceh, agreed with Ikrar’s point.

He said TNI’s intention to preserve its influence was evident in the its decision to push for a military operation in Aceh despite knowing that it was impossible to wipe out GAM within six months.

The past experience has shown that GAM members would bury their weapons and flee the province whenever there was a military operation, he explained.

“The military operation will exceed its planned duration and TNI will ask for extra budget and permission to extend the operation to maintain its relevance in internal affairs,” he said.

Sidney Jones, director of International Crisis Group (ICG) Indonesia, expressed similar concerns regarding the military operation.

The main problem with the operation is that nobody could provide adequate information as to what the real objective of the military operation is, she said.

“What is the purpose of the military operation? Is it to crush GAM, is it to force GAM back to the negotiating table, or is to lay the groundwork for a more concerted effort to win back the loyalty of Acehnese?” she asked.

Instead of taking a high-handed approach, she said, the government should address the political grievances of Acehnese people.

This can be done by looking at their demands for justice for past and ongoing human rights abuses, their resentment over high-level corruption, and the fact that the special autonomy package that was implemented in late 2001 has delivered no visible benefits to the population, she added.

“Most Acehnese would appreciate better personal security, but they will not get that from soldiers who go around threatening and abusing villagers suspected of being GAM sympathisers.

“The government should move quickly to improve local civilian governance, ensure a functioning criminal justice system, reduce the number of troops, and promise accountability for mistreatment of the civilian population,” she said.

Some observers, however, hold a less pessimistic view about the military operation.

Kusnanto Anggoro, senior researcher at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said there were indeed encouraging signs that the military is trying to improve its discipline in the operation in Aceh.

“The fact that soldiers were charged and sentenced to prison for assaulting civilians is quite good. Of course it will be better if these trials were conducted by an independent tribunal instead of the military court but you cannot even imagine this five years ago,” he said.

Thus far, tens of soldiers have been jailed for beating up villagers in Aceh during the operation. Several other soldiers were also found guilty of raping Acehnese women and were sentenced to between two-and-a-half and three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment.

Last month, TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto also apologised to the Acehnese people for the suffering that the military campaign has caused and promised to punish troops committing violations such as looting in villages where the residents were moved to makeshift camps.

Kusnanto said he could not see how the military would reap any real political benefit from the operation if it succeeds.

“The military sees itself as the defender of the Indonesian Republic. I think they want to be recognised and remembered as the defender of a unitary state before they quit active politics starting 2004,” he said.

Nevertheless, he stressed that it is important for the media and rights groups to monitor the conduct of the operation and any abuses of human rights.

Equally important is that Indonesian society continues to exert pressure on the government to ensure that reform of TNI is not sidetracked and that the civilian authorities, not the military, are chiefly in control of the operation in Aceh, he added.

“Accountability remains a big problem within TNI. But my criticism on the slow progress in military reform goes to the civilian authorities because they should be defining rules for the military. This is not happening because politicians still rely on military support to win elections,” he said.

Judging by the military’s success in regaining territorial control in Aceh, he said it seemed likely that TNI will suppress GAM’s strength to a minimum level though the separatist movement could not be destroyed entirely.

He said the chances for a military victory are increased with a better chain of command under martial law administrator Maj. Gen. Endang Suwarya, an military officer who is familiar with the terrains and GAM’s hide-outs in Aceh.

However, he said a military victory is not enough to ensure lasting peace in Aceh.

“It is important to have proper execution of the non-military parts of the integrated operation. Restoration of law and order, humanitarian aids as well as the implementation of special autonomy package are the key to overall success.

“If the government fails to take up on the military victory and improve the condition in Aceh, then the political defeat will go to Jakarta,” he warned.

He said the government must also be prepared to resume negotiations with GAM when and if the time comes.

Speaking along the same line of reasoning, Kirsten Schulze, senior lecturer in international history at the London School of Economics (LSE), said there is still room for peaceful solutions to the conflict in Aceh even with the ongoing military operation.

“If you look more closely at peace processes around the world you seldom have just dialogue. In most cases there is a dynamic of negotiation and violence,” she said.

Such was the case with the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement (CoHA) in December 2002. GAM concluded the agreement shortly after the military surrounded one of the movement’s strongholds in Aceh.

Schulze said there were two possible scenarios for peace within the next few months.

“The first is to use this military operation to significantly weaken GAM on the ground with the aim of making its leadership in exile more compliant so that they will agree to autonomy at future talks. This is based on the belief that GAM is willing and capable of compromise.

“The second scenario presumes that GAM will not compromise under any circumstances and consequently this military operation will weaken GAM in order to create space for focused economic development and addressing the grievances of the population.

“Both, if meticulously implemented, can lead to peace in Aceh,” she remarked.

She noted that TNI has had the upper hand in the military operation and has dealt some serious blows to the mid-level GAM leadership.

“There’s no doubt that TNI is technologically and militarily superior as GAM has comparatively few weapons,” she said. “TNI's success, however, depends on their ability to target GAM’s structure, communication lines, arm supplies and funding as well as to cut GAM off from its popular support base without inflicting too much violence on the civilian population.”

Hasballah Saad, former human rights minister, said the military operation in Aceh has two advantages which it did not have in the past.

“The international community does not oppose much to it. The majority of Indonesians seem to support it too [a poll in Indonesia’s largest daily Kompas last November showed that 79.6 percent of respondents outside Aceh and 54.6 percent inside in favour of a military operation in the province],” he said.

United States deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz had advised at the onset of the operation that the Aceh conflict should be resolved through peace talks which US has long sponsored, but did not suggest any form of action or pressure if the Indonesian government did not heed his words.

Australian ambassador to Indonesia David Ritchie meanwhile said his government “understands” Indonesia’s right to uphold its territorial integrity though Australia still prefers a peace solution to the problems.

In June, Indonesia’s neighbours in the region also voiced out their support for the military operation at the Asean Regional Forum in Cambodia for fear of regional instability.

Be that as it may, LSE’s Schulze cautioned that the answer to the problems in Aceh requires more than just a military solution.

“GAM is about the idea of independence and that, of course, must be challenged politically rather than militarily. In the short-term TNI tends to be successful in reducing GAM's capacity but human rights abuses and the failure to deal with the political dimension of GAM has always resulted in strengthening GAM in the long-run.

“Military success also does not equate to a resolution of the conflict in Aceh. There are political and economic issues which need to be addressed,” she said.

ICG’s Jones said both TNI and GAM will not restart negotiation on their own and therefore the international community should continue to look for ways to bring the two parties back to the process.

“If negotiations resume, it will almost certainly need to have a government, rather than an non-governmental organisation like the Henri Dunant Centre, as the facilitator,” she said.

She also said the new round of talks, if any, should take place in secret at the early stage, rather than in full public view, so that the two sides would not feel obliged to stake out their positions to satisfy their constituencies.

“If need be, the talks might have to take place without the participation of the GAM leadership in Sweden,” she suggested.

All said, the key tasks of the integrated operation are not mutually exclusive and the government should ensure that much non-military ground work is carried out effectively starting now, and that the soldiers will behave or be given due punishment.

The military is after all a state apparatus which is not all superior and above the law.

Acehnese need to see this for themselves, and Indonesians at large, deserve such an assurance.