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CONTENT ANALYSIS:
DECONSTRUCTING MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MINDANAO CRISIS

Prepared by the Center for Media Freedom & Responsibility (CMFR), a SEAPA member organization. The study was sponsored by the Mindanao Business Council and the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program of US-AID.

This report presents a review and analysis of the press coverage of the Mindanao crisis during the months of hostage-taking by the Abu Sayyaf and the Armed Forces of the Philippines' offensive against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from March to June 2000.

FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The war in Mindanao has already cost many lives, as well as millions of pesos in economic losses and government funds for military expenditures.

Despite these costs, the threat of prolonged conflict has not dissipated even with the much-publicized capture of Camp Abubakar, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front's main camp. Tensions between Muslims and Christians are intensifying, with all their attendant possibilities for continuing and heightened ethnic strife. The long-term impact of the Mindanao crisis, particularly the armed conflict, on Philippine society as a whole could also include the worsening of the economic, social and cultural problems that have plagued the Republic since its founding.

For its consequences alone, the Mindanao crisis is news. For mass media, it has become the number one story of the last three months. Since mass media are the main sources of citizen information on the crisis, it may be presumed that much of what Filipinos have come to know about the crisis as well as their sentiments on the main protagonists come from mass media. This makes mass media crucial factors in public understanding of this crisis, and therefore, in the public's opinions as important inputs in governance.

Mass media practitioners may claim that their task is merely to mirror what is happening in society. But media processes are subject to the selective discrimination of the reporter at the beat and the editor at the desk. While mass media should ideally "tell what happened," the difficulties inherent in meeting that responsibility often make the tasks of reporters, editors and opinion writers extremely problematic.

It is easy enough to say that the reporter must report the truth. However, the individual reporter's own beliefs and biases, the quality and quantity of his sources, as well as a newspaper's editorial policy and those convictions and biases most individuals have on an issue of public concern do shape the kind of news stories that appear on the front pages, as well as the opinions that see print in the opinion-editorial sections. The result could be public misinformation - and therefore a failure of the democratic process which depends so critically on a sovereign people's having access to accurate and meaningful information for decision-making.

To determine the scope of press coverage of the Mindanao crisis, as well as whether it has been substantially fair, enlightening and balanced, the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) did a content analysis covering the months of March, April, May and June - the critical months of the crisis, and therefore the months during which the Philippine press was likely to have concentrated its coverage of Mindanao events.

Methodology

Content analysis as used in journalism research is a method that through purposive sampling and analysis seeks to determine the content and slant of news and opinion, the treatment of personalities in the news, and news sourcing.

Newspapers Studied

The CMFR study looked at the news and opinion pages of five Metro Manila-based broadsheets - Business World, the Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Philippine Star and Today. The period covered was from March 1-June 30, 2000.

Article Types

The researchers grouped the articles in the above pages into news, editorials and columns, as well as background material. However, the last two categories overlapped in the few instances when an opinion column also attempted to provide background material on Mindanao.

Subject Matter

On the basis of subject matter, the researchers identified the following as the subjects of the articles studied: Military conflict; Soldiers; the Mindanao situation; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); the Abu Sayyaf; the Basilan hostages; the Jolo hostages; Local business; the National economy; Evacuations and refugees; Peace and unity; Peace negotiations; Women and children; the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); Bombings and other kidnappings; the Federalism proposal; Government policies; and others.

The analysis of articles used the following criteria:

  • Number, frequency and prominence of articles - placement of news stories; whether they appeared on the front page or in the inside pages
  • Treatment - whether the story treated the news subject positively or negatively
  • What sources were used, as well as whether a number of sources, or only one source, was used

CONTENT ANALYSIS FINDINGS

Number, Frequency And Prominence Of Articles

As expected the broadsheets studied gave the Mindanao crisis the attention it deserves by covering it extensively. A total of 1,633 articles appeared in the Philippine Star, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Today, BusinessWorld, and the Manila Daily Bulletin during the period under study.

Reflecting the rapid deterioration of the Mindanao situation into crisis proportions, 179 articles appeared in these broadsheets in March; 220 in April; 543 in May; and 691 in June. Of the total articles published during the four month period, 30% appeared in the Inquirer; 25% in Today; 22% in the Star; 13% in BusinessWorld; and 10% in the Bulletin.

As the Mindanao crisis intensified, the number of front page articles began to increase from a low of 67 in March to a high of 370 in June, for a total of 879 articles appearing on the front pages during the four-month period. Articles on Mindanao in the inside pages, totaling 756, also increased from 112 in March to 321 by June.

Of the total 1633 articles, columns and commentaries accounted for 112, while editorials numbered 102.

Discussion

Reports on the Mindanao crisis appeared in the Philippine Star as early as March, when the shooting war was just about to break out. Most of these reports, 27, were in the inside-pages. Eleven (11) were front page articles. The number of Star front page Mindanao news stories increased to 32 in April while those in the inside pages decreased to 18. The number of Star articles on the Mindanao crisis increased in late April after the kidnapping in Sipadan Island.

The number of Mindanao crisis-related news stories in the Star continued to increase in May and June. Sixty-seven (67) news stories appeared on the front page, while 52 were in the inside pages for May. In June, there were 143 Mindanao crisis-related news stories in the Star. Of these, 77 were on the front page and 66 in the inside pages. The number of stories in the inside pages included 49 Star editorials and columns during the period covered by the study.

The Inquirer articles about the Mindanao crisis in March were almost equally divided between the front page and the inside pages. Twenty-one (21) articles were on the front page with the remaining 16 in the inside pages in the Inquirer issues of March. In April, the number of Inquirer front page articles increased to 36 out of 50 articles; inside page articles were only a little more than a dozen. The subjects of these articles ranged from MILF-government negotiations to the Basilan hostages and the Abu Sayyaf.

A dramatic increase in the number of articles in the Inquirer, both on the front page and in the inside pages, occurred in May and June. Of 170 Inquirer articles on the Mindanao crisis in May, 100 were on the front page while the remaining 70 were in the inside pages.

The Inquirer printed 122 front page news stories about Mindanao in its June issues. Forty-five (45) articles were either editorials or opinion pieces. The total number of Inquirer articles on Mindanao for June was 229. Of these, 184 were news stories, 22 editorials and 23 opinion columns.

The Abu Sayyaf's admission that the foreign tourists kidnapped in Sipadan in late April had been turned over by another group to their custody increased the number of articles in the Inquirer. The increased coverage the kidnappings drew from both national and international media further boosted this number.

A total of 406 Mindanao-related articles were printed by Today during the period under study. There were 259 front page reports; 147 in the inside pages of which 23 opinion articles and 15 editorials on Mindanao.

As the crisis in Mindanao escalated, there was a steady increase in the number of Today's Mindanao-related news articles from March to June. At the same time, the news reports' placement gradually shifted from the inside pages to the front pages.

At the start of the conflict in March, Today printed only 59 Mindanao news articles. Of these, 21 were front page news articles while 38 were in the inside pages. By June the number had increased almost three-fold at 159 news articles. One hundred-five (105) were on the front page while only 54 were in the inside pages.

Banner stories on Mindanao started to regularly appear in Today towards the end of March, due to the MILF's occupation of the Kauswagan town hall on March 16, which signaled the start of intensified fighting between government troops and the MILF, followed by the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings in Basilan and Sipadan. In May and June, the Today banner story was almost always on the Mindanao crisis.

BusinessWorld published 217 articles on Mindanao from March to June. Of this number, 193 were news reports and 24 opinion articles. Despite BusinessWorld's market niche as a business paper, it gave considerable importance to the Mindanao situation. BusinessWorld did not have any editorial on the crisis since it does not normally have an editorial.

Among the 217 articles published by BusinessWorld during the four-month period under study, only five were banner stories. All five dealt with the effects of the crisis on the economy.

However, there was a steady increase in the number of BusinessWorld news articles from March to June. The figure for May, 71, was almost double that of March (28), and April (30). In June the number increased to 76.

BusinessWorld printed 12 front page articles on Mindanao; 205 Mindanao-related news articles appeared in its inside pages. BusinessWorld put only one article on the front page in March. For the whole month of April, nothing on Mindanao was printed on the BusinessWorld front page. It bannered the Mindanao situation only twice in May, but nine times in June.

BusinessWorld front page articles were consistently fewer than its articles in the inside pages, but the reports increased in number during the four-month period. In March there were 28; 30 in April; 71 in May; and 76 in June.

Almost all, or 13 out of the 16 Manila Bulletin March reports on the Mindanao crisis, received front-page treatment. The reports were mostly on the possible outcome of the peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) panel and the MILF and the government's vision for peace and development in Mindanao.

The Bulletin gave news about appeals for peace from various sectors prominent treatment in April. However, its reports on the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings outnumbered its reports on the escalating war between the MILF and government troops. The number of Bulletin reports on the Mindanao crisis increased from 16 in March to 24 in April, most of them about the Abu Sayyaf kidnapping.

However, the Bulletin continued in April to give banner treatment to stories on the government's views on the GRP-MILF peace talks. Although reports on the government's war with the MILF and the Mindanao crisis as a whole were dominant, stories from the government perspective were again given prominent treatment in the Bulletin in June.

In general, the Bulletin gave reports on the Mindanao crisis prominent treatment. Of 164 articles, 141 appeared on the Bulletin front page. Of 24 inside-page articles, only ten were news stories. The remaining 14 were opinion pieces.

From these findings it is evident that the broadsheets studied regarded the Mindanao crisis as significant enough to deserve extensive coverage, including front page treatment.

The amount of information made available to readers, at least from the five newspapers studied - three of which claim the largest circulations in the country - would thus appear to be adequate, averaging 326.6 per newspaper during the four-month period, or 81.65 articles per month per newspaper. But the kind of information that was thereby made available - as reflected in subject matter, article type, and treatment - is equally crucial.

Subject Matter

In terms of subject matter, the Mindanao-related articles in the five broad sheets were overwhelmingly on the Jolo hostages (317), followed by the military conflict (279 articles). Articles on the Basilan hostages followed in frequency, with 180 articles. There were 136 articles on bombings and other kidnappings; 108 articles on government policies; 100 on ARMM/OIC/ the MNLF; 97 on the peace negotiations; 80 on the national economy; 66 on the themes of peace and unity. Soldiers were the subjects of 9 articles; articles on the general Mindanao situation 48; the MILF, 46; the Abu Sayyaf 37; local business 23; evacuations 24; women and children 8; and federalism 23.

These figures show that the reporting on Mindanao followed the patterns dictated by commercial interests in the form of circulation boosting, given the emphasis on violence and other issues that lend themselves to sensational treatment. The lop-sided emphasis on the Jolo hostages compared to the coverage of the Basilan hostages appears to have been motivated by the above impulse.

The reporting on the Jolo hostages was also accompanied by photographs meant to emphasize their state of health and living conditions as well as their moments of emotional crisis. While this is understandable, that the Basilan hostages did not receive the same level of attention suggests that the news agenda was being shaped not only by the world attention focused on the foreign hostages, but also by their story's being more susceptible to sensational treatment.

Background Material

Of the 1,633 articles that appeared in all five broadsheets from March to June, only 22 may be classified as background material, in the sense of their attempting to put events in Mindanao in a socio-historical context so as to broaden public understanding of the crisis. This is only a little more than one percent of all the articles studied.

Of the 22, three appeared in the Bulletin; two in BusinessWorld; seven in Today; two in the Star; and eight in the Inquirer. The most comprehensive background materials were provided by the Inquirer, which published, among other articles, a two-part interview with MILF Chair Hashim Salamat.

However, the relative paucity of background material raises the question of how successfully the press has made the Mindanao crisis comprehensible to their readers, since events reported out of context are likely to be misunderstood.

When reports on such events are at the same time predominantly sourced from only one of two protagonists, the problem is further compounded, since the parties involved in the conflict have their respective agendas which could be furthered through the dissemination of misleading information, or even through disinformation.

Sources

The overwhelming source of information as far the news stories and some of the opinion pieces were concerned - a total of 1,428 - was government, which was the source for 1,055 of the above articles. The Abu Sayyaf was the source in 72 of the articles; the MILF in 67; the business community in 18, civil society 37; the religious sector 38; and others, 141.

The Star reports were generally based on government sources, including its reports on the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf. The reports about Nur Misuari and the MNLF were from hostile such as PNP Director Panfilo Lacson and AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes. Only the Star's business stories were sourced from non-government sources (business people).

The amount of government sources used in the Inquirer's articles greatly outnumbered sources from other sectors. In March, May and June, a great majority of its sources were from the government - 271 out of 300 sources for the three-month period. However, in April, only a little more than half (58%) of the total number of sources came from the government. Statements from the Abu Sayyaf, the MILF, the religious sector and other groups accounted for 18 of the 43 sources counted for that month.

Information from the Inquirer's government sources was usually followed by a corresponding statement - whether comments, opinions or objections - from the other party, either the spokesperson of the MILF or the Abu Sayyaf. The Inquirer also had reports in which a government official contradicted what another government official said. Such was the case on May 19, when one government source claimed that a $2M ransom was being demanded by the Abu Sayyaf, while another said that no such demand was made. But out of the 389 major sources used in Inquirer stories, 271 were government sources.

The Inquirer used the business sector as a source three times during the period under study - all in June. Only two of the stories were about the business situation in Mindanao while the other was about a businessman's donating P1 million to free some of the Basilan hostages: "Mindanao fighting seen slashing company earnings, hitting stocks", "Trader gives P1M for Basilan hostages", "Fighting keeps PAL away from Cotabato".

The Inquirer used sources from the religious sector more often than sources from the business community. Fifteen of the total number of Inquirer sources were from the religious sector. The majority of these were from the Catholic Church. Some of the headlines: "Bulacan Muslims denounce Abu Sayyaf", "CBCP condemns killings", "Pope rues death of hostages", "Bishop appeals for help for Mindanao evacuees", and "Sin calls for 50-day prayer and fasting".

The government was almost always the major source of Today news reports. At any given month in this study almost all of the articles of Today relied mainly on government sources.

In March, 50 out of 57 Today reports were sourced from the government. The next major source was the Abu Sayyaf-which was, however, a major source of only three articles.

There was a drop in the number of articles Today sourced from the government in April. Only 29 of 54 Mindanao-related Today articles were attributed to the government. The next major Today source was the Abu Sayyaf, which was the source of eight articles.

In May and June, 92 of 116, and 102 of 141 Today articles were sourced from the government respectively.

Almost all the Mindanao-related articles in BusinessWorld were similarly sourced from the government.

The government was the major source in 151 out of 193 Mindanao-related articles in BusinessWorld. Far behind the government were 'Others,' 16 articles, and the MILF, 13 articles, the next two major sources of information tapped by reporters.

There were no BusinessWorld reporters in Mindanao; all were in Metro Manila during the period under study. BusinessWorld therefore relied heavily on the services of Reuters and other wire services for reports on the hot spots in Mindanao.

The Bulletin reports were also generally attributed to government sources. As in the other papers, the reports about the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf had government officials such as Orlando Mercado and Roberto Aventajado as sources.

Government officials were the major sources in 161 of the Bulletin's reports. Twenty-seven articles relied on sources such as foreign journalists, foreign governments, and personal observation, among others.

The Bulletin reports on personalities lobbying for peace were mostly from government or government-related sources, if not government officials, with the exception of some religious leaders

Positive And Negative Treatment

How did the major actors in the Mindanao story fare in their media treatment?

Those who ended up looking good were also the dominant sources of news. Where did the press get much of the stories? From government officials, civilian or military, who clearly get pretty good treatment in the coverage.

In general, favorable treatment was reserved for the government and military and the negative for the Abu Sayyaf, the MILF and Muslims in general.

However, the editorials were more critical of government, even as the military continued to get negative comments. MILF treatment in the editorials was mixed, but Muslim personalities such as Nur Misuari generally received negative treatment.

Business/Economy

The discussion of Mindanao as a region should include the perspective or outlook for business and the regional economy. During this crisis, the business/economic news received significantly less news space.

Even in BusinessWorld, Mindanao economy and business did not amount to much in the news agenda.

What Caused The "War?"

The coverage of Mindanao before the first critical date in this period of analysis, the Basilan hostage taking on March 21, revealed that the press carried mostly stories about the peace talks which were still in process between government and the MILF. The stories on military/MILF encounters or on armed actions by Muslim militants appeared in the coverage as sporadic incidents. None of these served as any indication that the MILF or the military was building up or preparing for a total war offensive.

The topics in March before the Basilan kidnappings were:

  • Peace negotiations (GRP-MILF)
  • Skirmishes between government troops and MILF

Newspaper readers must have found the sudden outbreak of hostilities surprising, and inviting the question, "What caused the "war" to break out?"

According to the reports that did get published, the military said it took up the offensive because, among others,

  • The MILF had violated terms of agreements.
  • The MILF had resorted to extortion.
  • The MILF had begun attacking civilians.

A retrospective analysis shows the following events and the appearance of reports on the fighting. (Table 7)

The agreement on April 27 between the Government forces and the MILF over the Narciso Ramos Highway suggests the untimeliness of the military attacks against the MILF. Both the military and MILF had reached a tenative agreement to work out a solution to the occupation of parts of the highway by MILF forces. Part of the agreement was that their respective forces would withdraw to their previous positions.

This agreement was not given any prominence in the news coverage, although it was vaguely referred to in a number of stories. A story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer enumerated the points of the military-MILF agreement, but this was buried in the jump section of a front-page story.

These points were:

For the Philippine National Police to take over the Ramos Highway to ensure security and law and order.

For government and MILF units to remain in their current positions.

For the joint ceasefire committee to submit its recommendations on the issue on or before May 15, 2000.

Only the Philippine Post gave this prominent front-page play. This story had peace-advocate priest Fr. Eliseo Mercado as a source and drew from his perspective.

The Inquirer referred to speculation in some sectors about the purpose of the war in an editorial (May 9) and in an interview article focused on Musim leader and academic Dr. Michael Mastura (May 7).

The editorial referred to a "wag-the-dog" scenario. In the interview article, Dr. Mastura referred to the government scenario as the "Putin formula."

The Invisible Security Framework

Usually, in the course of war and other kinds of conflicts, news will involve the larger perspective of national security.

Reference to this larger framework of security in the press was practically nil. National Security Adviser Gen. Alexander Aquirre said that as of September 1999 the Cabinet Security Cluster had drawn up a framework on the Mindanao conflict.

CONCLUSION

The following conclusions may be drawn from the results of this study:

The government was the overwhelming source of news stories. This preponderance of the government view raises questions not only about the balance and fairness of the reporting, but also about the accuracy of the news reports and the reliability of such news as the basis of opinion pieces, of columns as well as editorials. Statements to the press about the course of the war generally were sourced from AFP headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo. There were few, if any, correspondents directly in touch with field commanders or with communities affected by the war.

The disturbing paucity of background material raises the question on how well the press made this crisis comprehensible to the public, since events reported out of context are usually open to misunderstanding, especially if they are part of a complex historical process.

This poverty of background material blurred in the public mind the clear distinction between the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF and the difference in their goals and methods. This resulted in their equal "demonization," and unfortunately, that of all Muslims. This was aided by the expressions of anti-Muslim sentiments by some columnists and editorial writers as well as by the mostly negative treatment Muslim sources received from the press.

This lack of background did not diminish public ignorance about the course of implementation of the comprehensive peace process. The media did not refer to past gains, nor the course set by law to provide meaningful autonomy for the Muslim community. The public had no real understanding or appreciation of the legitimate grievances of the Muslim community who still have to convince themselves that the government is serious about addressing the demand for autonomy and the recognition of their way of life.

This lack of background material in the press matches the policy style of this administration, which resorts to decision-making without consultation of and reference to a larger policy process.

These gaps of press coverage also ignore the larger policy question and the more comprehensive interpretation of this crisis as more than just war and military operations.

The emphasis on military conflict and the hostage incidents drove other subject matters out of the news pages, thus providing a lop-sided picture of events in Mindanao. There were days when the front pages of the major broadsheets covered nothing else but news of the hostages, providing a lop-sided picture of events in the rest of the country.

Because of the greater emphasis on the Jolo hostages relative to the MILF conflict, the Abu Sayyaf received more exposure than the MILF; despite the latter's lengthy on-again, off-again peace talks with the government. Both the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF were commonly referred to as "terrorists " and "rebels," again blurring the distinction between the two.

The Abu Sayyaf ended up gaining more legitimacy than it apparently deserves. This exposure on the same level of the MILF and the merging of their identities into one paint the Muslim struggle in the darkest light, weakening the justification and rationalization of the urgent need to address their grievances.

There was no attempt to call reader attention to the fact that the armed hostilities were taking place between Filipinos, not between Filipinos and people from another country. On the contrary, there was much saber-rattling and even calls for a ruthless battle campaign. This could have contributed to the resurgence of anti-Muslim sentiments evident since the Sipadan hostage taking.

Recall the conduct of the war in Mindanao during the Marcos regime, not as a prescription of how to do things, but to note the impact of "news" on public sentiment. The war in Mindanao during the Marcos period was largely kept as an invisible operation, with the press completely controlled and regulated by the government. The news that came out of the military were mostly limited to ceremonial appearances of generals, public officials with Muslim surrenderees, and later the Tripoli agreement.

In contrast, press coverage of this war has been open and extensive. But the style and treatment of news of this war may also cause the rising negative public perception of and opinion about Muslim Filipinos; perhaps more than the Mindanao wars of the seventies did at the time.

Social Weather Stations has pointed out that one of the constants of public opinion in the Philippines has been a degree of anti-Muslim prejudice. Nevertheless, the Philippines has been fortunate enough not to be afflicted by the kind of ethnic conflict seen in neighboring ASEAN countries. With the peace process gaining ground and the work of peace advocates in the last decade, inter-faith harmony had risen significantly, especially with the relative stability gained during the Ramos years. We can only hope that this crisis does not lead to a bitter divide that sets Christian and Muslim Filipinos apart.

The coverage of this war together with those official public statements by the president showing a marked insensitivity to the place and the struggle of Muslim Filipinos may have easily raised levels of resentment. Carol Arguillas, PDI Mindanao Bureau chief and columnist, recounts incidents of prejudicial treatment of Muslim civilians in Manila. Unless government begins to change its tack and reverts to the framework of its total approach, the resentment between Muslims and non-Muslims can deepen into lines of conflict that will be more difficult to erase.

One can speculate that the higher approval ratings enjoyed by the president has come from the successful wooing of public approval through the means of war. The Erap government may have found a solution to the problem of his sagging popularity. But we cannot know what this has cost in terms of peace.

As for the press, the treatment of these recent developments shows once again a failure to conduct the public service of news gathering and dissemination as an educational process. It is not enough for people to know about the conduct of military operations by government troops taking over former MILF territory. This is only a small and narrow aspect of what is really going on.

The news here is not only about the events but the background and context of events. Once again, the "bad news" has not occasioned a learning experience for the public - the broadening or deepening of public understanding about historical conflict.

The public remains ignorant of the whole picture that constitutes the Mindanao reality. In the beginning of this crisis, some respondents to television surveys said that they really did not feel affected by the news, saying Mindanao was so far away. Such listeners and readers were provided with limited information and it would not be surprising if, after so much news on Mindanao, they did not gain a greater understanding or appreciation of what is needed to create the conditions that will finally bring peace to this part of the country.

The flawed treatment of complex news holds back public understanding of the issues involved in crisis. In the case of Mindanao, this public ignorance makes it so much easier for national leadership to keep slipping into blind corners, and to undertake and sustain a course of action that creates greater problems in Mindanao and the rest of the country.

For More Information Contact CMFR.

 

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